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Abstract
Orderings of interdependence among random variables are useful in many economic contexts,
for example, in assessing ex post inequality under uncertainty; in comparing multidimensional
inequality; in valuing portfolios of assets or insurance policies; and in assessing systemic risk.
We explore ﬁve orderings of interdependence for multivariate distributions: greater weak asso-
ciation, the supermodular ordering, the convex-modular ordering, the dispersion ordering, and
the concordance ordering. For two dimensions, all ﬁve orderings are equivalent, whereas for an
arbitrary number of dimensions n > 2, the ﬁve orderings are strictly ranked. For the special
case of binary random variables, we establish some equivalences among the orderings.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In many economic contexts, it is of interest to know whether one set of random variables displays
a greater degree of interdependence than another. This paper explores several orderings of interde-
pendence for multivariate distributions and establishes the relationships among the orderings, both
in general as well as in the important special case when all random variables are binary.
Orderings of interdependence are applicable in several welfare-economic contexts. In many group
settings where individual outcomes (e.g. rewards) are uncertain, members of the group may be
concerned, ex ante, about how unequal their ex post rewards will be (Meyer and Mookherjee [40];
Ben-Porath et al [9]; Gajdos and Maurin [25]; Kroll and Davidovitz [36]; Adler and Sanchirico [2];
Chew and Sagi [17]). (This concern is distinct from concerns about the mean level of rewards and
about their riskiness.) Comparisons of reward schemes then require comparisons of the degree of
interdependence of the random rewards.
Another welfare-economic application concerns comparisons of inequality when individual-level
data are available on multiple attributes such as income, health, and education (Atkinson and
Bourguignon [6]; Bourguignon and Chakravarty [11]; Atkinson [5]). As long as the function aggre-
gating the diﬀerent attributes into an overall measure of welfare or deprivation for individuals is not
additively separable across attributes, comparisons of multidimensional inequality will necessitate
comparisons of the degree of interdependence among the attributes.1
Interdependence orderings are also useful for comparing the eﬃciency of matching mechanisms. In
many matching contexts, perfectly assortative matching would be eﬃcient, and it would correspond
to a “perfectly positively dependent” joint distribution of the random variables representing quality
in each category (dimension). When, however, matches are formed based only on noisy or coarse
information (McAfee [38]), or when search is costly (Shimer and Smith [50]), or when signaling
is constrained by borrowing constraints (Fernandez and Gali [24]), perfectly assortative matching
will generally not arise. Fernandez and Gali [24] and Meyer and Rothschild [41] apply bivariate
dependence orderings to compare the performance of diﬀerent matching institutions.2
1There are important formal diﬀerences between these two welfare-economic applications. In the measurement of
ex post inequality under uncertainty, the number of dimensions represents the number of individuals in the group,
whereas in the measurement of multidimensional inequality, the number of dimensions represents the number of
attributes.
2In a related application, Prat [46] explores how the composition of employee teams aﬀects interdependence in
2Orderings of interdependence can also be applied to make comparisons across decision-making
groups of the degree of alignment in the preferences of group members. Boland and Proschan
[10] and Baldiga and Green [7] focus on assessments of the similarity among diﬀerent individuals’
ordinal preferences over alternatives. In a strategic model of consensus building within a committee,
Caillaud and Tirole [13] study how the degree of interdependence of members’ ex ante uncertain
payoﬀs from a proposal aﬀects the proposer’s optimal persuasion strategy.
In theoretical or experimental studies of information transmission in networks (Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson [14], Choi, Gale, and Kariv [19]), interdependence orderings can be used to assess how
the degree of concordance of individuals’ ex ante uncertain actions or outcomes varies with time
and with social structure, as represented by the network.
Finally, in ﬁnance and insurance, valuing portfolios of assets or insurance policies requires assessing
the degree of interdependence among asset returns or insurance claims (M¨ uller and Stoyan [45];
Denuit et al [21]). Financial economists and macroeconomists are, moreover, increasingly interested
in measures and comparisons of “systemic risk” in ﬁnancial and economic systems that reﬂect the
interdependence in the returns of diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions, sectors, or regions (Hennessey and
Lapan [29]; Adrian and Brunnermeier [3]; Acharya [1]; Beale et al [8]).
For the special case of bivariate distributions, economists and statisticians have shown that two
intuitive concepts of greater interdependence are in fact equivalent. Suppose we are comparing
the degree of interdependence between (Y1,Y2) with that between (X1,X2), where for each i, Yi
and Xi have the same marginal distribution. The ﬁrst concept is “lower orthant dominance”,
which requires that for all points in the support of the random vectors Y and X, the cumulative
distribution function of Y be at least as large the c.d.f. of X: this captures the requirement
that the components of Y are more likely than those of X to both be “low” together, for any
thresholds determining the precise meaning of “low”. Given the assumption of identical marginal
distributions, lower orthant dominance is equivalent to “upper orthant dominance”, which requires
that the components of Y be more likely than those of X to both be “high” together. The second
concept of greater interdependence is “supermodular dominance”, which requires that Ew(Y ) be
at least as large as Ew(X) for all objective functions w that are supermodular. Supermodularity
(see Topkis [52] and Section 2.3 below) is a natural property of an objective function with which
to capture a preference for interdependence, since it captures the idea that its arguments are
complements, not substitutes: For a supermodular function (of two or more arguments), the eﬀect
of an increase in the value of any argument is larger, the larger are the values of the other arguments.
(ex ante random) decisons of team members and shows how properties of the the production function translate into
preferences over team composition.
3It has been shown, in the economics literature by Levy and Parousch [37], Epstein and Tanny [22],
and Atkinson and Bourguignon [6] and in the statistics literature by Tchen [51], that for two-
dimensional random vectors with identical marginals, lower-orthant dominance of Y over X is
equivalent to Ew(Y ) ≥ Ew(X) for all supermodular objective functions w.
Economists have, nevertheless, made very little progress in the development of orderings for com-
paring interdependence in multivariate, as opposed to bivariate, distributions. On the one hand,
this is surprising, given the wide variety of applications for such orderings in both theoretical and
empirical work. On the other hand, though, this lack of progress is less surprising given that, as
we now argue, the n-dimensional case is substantially more diﬃcult than the 2-dimensional case,
for several reasons.
First, whereas positive and negative interdependence are “mirror images” of each other in two
dimensions, this symmetry breaks down for more than two dimensions. In two dimensions, for
any plausible concept of positive dependence, if Y1 and Y2 are positively dependent, then −Y1
and Y2 are negatively dependent. Moreover, for Y1 and Y2 with identical uniform marginals on
[0,1], perfect positive dependence corresponds to Y2 = Y1, while perfect negative dependence
corresponds to Y2 = 1 − Y1. For more than two dimensions, however, there is in general no
simple way to convert a positively interdependent random vector (Y1,Y2,...,Yn) into a negatively
interdependent one. And even for {Yi}n
i=1 with identical uniform marginals on [0,1], while Y1 =
Y2 = ... = Yn represents perfect positive dependence, there is no obvious deﬁnition of perfect
negative dependence.3 Since multivariate concepts of greater and lesser interdependence should be
applicable to distributions displaying either positive or negative dependence, the lack of symmetry
between positive and negative dependence in n > 2 dimensions complicates the development of
orderings.4
Second, for n > 2 dimensions, there are more distinct notions of greater interdependence than there
are for n = 2. Section 2 below presents ﬁve dependence orderings, three previously deﬁned and
two new to this paper. Whereas for n = 2, all ﬁve orderings are equivalent, for an arbitrary n > 2,
the ﬁve orderings are strictly ranked. Thus, the selection of orderings of interdependence is more
3For the set of all distribution functions with given marginals F1,F2,...,Fn, there exist upper and lower bounds
for the distribution function, termed “Fr´ echet bounds”. The “upper Fr´ echet bound” is the natural candidate for the
distribution exhibiting maximal positive dependence. However, while the “lower Fr´ echet bound” might seem like a
natural candidate for the distribution displaying maximal negative dependence, the lower Fr´ echet bound is not in
fact a proper distribution function except in very special cases (which do not include the uniform example described
in the text). See Joe [35] and M¨ uller and Stoyan [45] for more details.
4Unfortunately, this lack of symmetry between positive and negative dependence for more than two dimensions is
not always recognized. See, for example, the discussion in Galeotti et al [26, fn. 12].
4complicated for multivariate distributions than for bivariate ones.
Finally, even for a given ordering of greater interdependence, determining whether two multivari-
ate distributions can be ranked according to the ordering may be more diﬃcult than for bivariate
distributions. For two dimensions, it is straightforward to determine whether one distribution dom-
inates another in the sense of “lower orthant dominance”: this requires comparing the cumulative
distribution functions at every point in the common support. For more than two dimensions, some
of the dependence orderings we study below can be implemented in an analogous fashion, by de-
termining, for each point in the support, whether a given set of inequalities is satisﬁed. However,
for other orderings, there exists no set of criteria that can be applied in a pointwise fashion; for
implementing these orderings, more sophisticated techniques or algorithms need to be developed.
1.2 Outline
In the next section, we present ﬁve orderings of greater interdependence for multivariate distribu-
tions. Three of these have received some attention in the statistics and economics literatures, while
two of them are new.
We begin with an ordering inspired by the dependence concept of “association”, a concept proposed
by Esary, Proschan, and Walkup [23] and widely used in statistics.5 6 Since the deﬁnition of
association cannot be meaningfully reversed to yield a concept of negative association, we turn
to the concept of “weak association” and use it to deﬁne the ordering we term “greater weak
association”. In the actuarial literature (see Denuit et al [21]), this ordering has been (somewhat
confusingly) named the “correlation order”.
We then present the (multivariate) supermodular ordering, which is the natural multivariate gen-
eralization of the concept of supermodular dominance discussed above for bivariate distributions.
Meyer and Mookherjee [40] and Meyer [39] contain early proposals to use it as a multivariate
dependence ordering, in the context of comparisons of ex post inequality under uncertainty. In
the statistical literature, the multivariate supermodular ordering was formalized by Shaked and
5Association, though a strong concept of dependence, is strictly weaker than “aﬃliation”, which is familiar to
economists from the work of Milgrom and Weber [43], who used it to formalize positive interdependence among
bidders’ valuations in auctions. De Castro [16] also notes that aﬃliation is strictly stronger than many other concepts
of positive dependence.
6Though association has not been widely used in economics, in a pair of recent papers, Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson [14, respectively 15] show that the employment statuses (respectively, wages) of individuals connected by a
social network are positively dependent in the sense of association.
5Shanthikumar [48].
In Section 2.4, we introduce a new dependence ordering, which we term the “convex-modular
ordering”. Greater interdependence for Y than for X according to the convex-modular ordering
corresponds to greater riskiness, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [47], of any aggregate
Pn
i=1 ri(Yi) compared to
Pn
i=1 ri(Xi), for any choice of {ri}n
i=1 nondecreasing. Convex-modular
objective functions are a natural way of capturing insurance companies’ preferences over the degree
of dependence in the claims arising from portfolios of insurance policies.
Section 2.5 introduces another new dependence ordering, which we term the “dispersion ordering”.
The dispersion ordering is motivated by the idea that interdependence in random vectors can be
compared by comparing the dispersion of the cdf’s of their order statistics, with lower disper-
sion representing greater interdependence. For the special case of random vectors with symmetric
distributions, Shaked and Tong [49] proposed a dependence ordering along these lines, using the
majorization ordering of vectors (Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [28]) to compare dispersion of the
cdf’s of the order statistics. The dispersion ordering we propose uses majorization in a similar
way and has the advantage of being applicable to asymmetric distributions. We show that greater
interdependence for Y than for X according to the dispersion ordering corresponds to greater risk-





i=1 I{Xi>si}, for any point (s1,...,sn) in the support. A natural application of the dispersion
ordering is to the assessment of systemic risk in ﬁnancial systems, where systemic risk is greater the




i=1 I{Yi≤si}) represents the number of banks that would be solvent (respectively, insolvent) if
bank i’s failure threshold (which may not be known by regulators) were si, and the systemic cost
function is a convex function of the number of insolvent banks. Importantly, and in contrast to
the greater weak association, supermodular, and convex-modular orderings, it is straightforward to
determine whether or not any two n-dimensional random vectors Y and X can be ranked according
to the dispersion ordering; it is suﬃcient to check, for each point in the support, whether a set of
n + 1 inequalities is satisﬁed.
Finally, we present the concordance ordering, which was formalized for multivariate distributions
by Joe [34] and which combines the requirement of upper-orthant dominance with that of lower-
orthant dominance.7 The concordance ordering shares with our dispersion ordering the advantage
of being easily checkable; for any number of dimensions, it is suﬃcient to check, for each point in
the support, whether two inequalities are satisﬁed.
7With more than two dimensions, even if Y and X have identical marginals, upper-orthant and lower-orthant
dominance are no longer equivalent.
6Section 3 presents our main results, which establish the relationships among the ﬁve orderings just
described. Theorem 1 shows that for two dimensions, all ﬁve orderings are equivalent. Theorem 2,
on the other hand, shows that for an arbitrary number of dimensions n > 2, the ﬁve orderings are
strictly ranked.
Section 4 focuses on binary random variables. Binary random variables, besides being common in
theoretical, experimental, and empirical applications, also help to illuminate the structure of and
relationships among the interdependence orderings. We study a variety of special cases with binary
random variables and highlight i) equivalences among the orderings that arise in these special cases
and ii) easily checkable and easily interpretable necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the orderings
to hold. We oﬀer a brief conclusion in Section 5.
2 Orderings of Greater Interdependence
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider multivariate distributions with the same number, n, of variables and identical, ﬁnite
support. Focusing on ﬁnite supports simpliﬁes notation, avoids some uninteresting technical issues,
and clariﬁes the underlying structure of the orderings and the relationships between them.
Formally, let Li denote the ﬁnite, totally ordered set of values taken by the ith random variable,
and let L denote the Cartesian product of the Li’s. Li is a ﬁnite subset of R, and L is a ﬁnite
lattice of Rn with the following partial order: z ≤ v if and only if zi ≤ vi for all i ∈ N = {1,...,n}.
If li denotes the cardinality of Li, then L has d =
Qn
i=1 li elements.
As argued by Joe [35, p.39], a natural desideratum for an ordering of interdependence is invariance
to monotonic relabelings of the elements of the support for each component. Formally, we say that
the ordering O is invariant to monotonic relabelings of coordinates if
(Y1,...,Yn) O (X1,...,Xn) =⇒ (r1(Y1),...,rn(Yn)) O (r1(X1),...,rn(Xn)) (1)
whenever ri : R → R, i ∈ {1,...,n}, are all nondecreasing. This invariance property captures the
idea that dependence orderings should be ordinal in that they should compare the extent to which
higher (respectively, lower) realizations in one dimension are accompanied by higher (respectively,
lower) realizations in other dimensions, regardless of the cardinal scales used for each dimension.
An example of monotonic relableling of coordinates is a componentwise coarsening of the support,
in which some adjacent elements in the support of each component are combined. For example,
7starting with the lattice L = {0,1,2}n, the nondecreasing transformations ri with, for all i, ri(0) = 0
and ri(1) = ri(2) = 1 coarsen the lattice to {0,1}n by combining the realizations {1,2} in each
dimension.
All of the interdependence orderings we consider in this paper will be invariant to monotonic
relabelings of coordinates, as deﬁned in (1). This is straightforward to conﬁrm from their formal
deﬁnitions below. Consistent with our deﬁnition of invariance in (1), in the formal deﬁnitions of
the orderings, when we consider monotonic functions, we allow these functions to be nondecreasing
rather than requiring them to be increasing. None of our results is aﬀected by this choice, but
proofs are simpliﬁed by the ability to use nondecreasing indicator functions (denoted by I).
While all of our interdependence orderings satisfy the invariance property in (1), some widely
used orderings, such as the (bivariate) linear correlation coeﬃcient, fail to satisfy this invariance
and, a fortiori, are not invariant to a coarsening of the support. A higher value of the linear
correlation coeﬃcient for one bivariate empirical distribution than another is therefore not a robust
indicator of greater dependence in the former distribution, since the ranking might be reversed
by aggregation of the data. To see this, for L = {l,m,h}2, where l < m < h, let (Y1,Y2) have
distribution g, where g(l,m) = g(m,l) = g(m,m) = g(h,h) = 1
4, and let (X1,X2) have distribution
f, where f(l,l) = f(m,m) = f(m,h) = f(h,m) = 1
4. Then corr(Y1,Y2) > (<)corr(X1,X2) if
(l+h)
2 > (<)m. This in turn implies that if the support L is coarsened by combining the realizations
l and m in each dimension, then corr(Y1,Y2) > corr(X1,X2), while if m and h are combined, then
corr(Y1,Y2) < corr(X1,X2).
Given that the orderings we consider below all satisfy the invariance property in (1), it is without
loss of generality, and convenient notationally, to assume henceforth that the sets Li of values taken
by the ith random variable each have the form {0,1,...,li − 1}.
For any z ∈ L, let z + ei denote the element v of L, whenever it exists, such that vj = zj for all
j ∈ N \ {i} and vi is the smallest element of Li greater than but not equal to zi. For example, if
L = {0,1}2, (0,0) + e1 = (1,0) and (1,0) + e2 = (0,0) + e1 + e2 = (1,1).
The lattice structure of the support L and its corresponding order are useful for comparing distri-
butions. One may label the d elements (or “nodes”) of L and view real functions on L as vectors of
Rd, where each coordinate of the vector corresponds to the value of the function at a speciﬁc node
of L. Similarly, a multivariate distribution whose support is L can be represented as an element
of the unit simplex ∆d of Rd. For any function w : L → R and distribution f ∈ ∆d, the expected




w(z)f(z) = w · f,
where · denotes the scalar product of w and f in Rd.
Suppose the random vectors Y and X have distributions g and f, respectively, and the former
distribution dominates the latter according to some ordering “O”. We will use the phrases “Y
dominates X according to the ordering O” and “g dominates f according to the ordering O”
interchangeably, and we denote the former by Y O X and the latter by g O f.
Given two distributions g and f on L, deﬁne the diﬀerence between them by
δ ≡ g − f. (2)
Most (though not all) of the orderings we consider are “diﬀerence-based orderings”, in that whether
or not two distributions g and f satisfy the ordering depends only on the corresponding δ. We will
frequently exploit this convenient property of diﬀerence-based orderings.8
2.2 Greater Weak Association
We begin with an ordering of greater interdependence that is inspired by the dependence concept
of association. Esary, Proschan, and Walkup [23] deﬁned association as follows:
Definition 1 (Association) A random vector Y with support L is associated if for all nonde-
creasing functions r,s : L → R, Cov(r(Y ),s(Y )) ≥ 0.
A concept of negative association deﬁned by reversing the inequality in the deﬁnition above would
be uninteresting: Y could only be negatively associated in this strong sense if it were constant (to
see this, consider functions r = s). This is an important motivation for studying a less stringent
concept, “weak association”, deﬁned by Burton, Dabrowski, and Dehling [12], along with its neg-
ative counterpart, “negative association”, deﬁned by Joag-Dev and Proschan [33]. In contrast to
“association”, which allows both r and s to depend on the entire vector Y , weak association and
negative association restrict them to depend on disjoint components of Y .9
8Some of the orderings of interdependence considered in this paper can be modiﬁed so they are responsive not
only to the interdependence of the elements of a random vector but also to the levels of the elements. For clarity of
focus, we will not explicitly consider these modiﬁcations of the orderings or the relations between them.
9It is clear from the deﬁnitions that association is a stronger concept than weak association. Hu, M¨ uller, and
Scarsini [30] have shown that it is strictly stronger, even for two dimensions.
9Definition 2 (Weak Association and Negative Association) A random vector Y with support L =
×n
i=1Li is weakly associated (respectively, negatively associated) if for any pair (A,B) of
disjoint subsets of {1,...,n} and nondecreasing functions r : ×i∈ALi → R and s : ×j∈BLj → R,
Cov(r(Yi, i ∈ A),s(Yj, j ∈ B)) ≥ 0 (respectively, Cov(r(Yi, i ∈ A),s(Yj, j ∈ B)) ≤ 0).
We can now deﬁne an interdependence ordering corresponding to weak association and negative
association as follows.10
Definition 3 (Greater Weak Association) Y displays greater weak association than X, de-
noted Y GWA X, if they have identical univariate marginal distributions and for all disjoint
subsets A,B of {1,...,n} and nondecreasing functions r : ×i∈ALi → R and s : ×j∈BLj → R,
Cov(r(Yi, i ∈ A),s(Yj, j ∈ B)) ≥ Cov(r(Xi, i ∈ A),s(Xj, j ∈ B)).
Note that Deﬁnition 3 assumes that the random vectors being compared have identical univariate
marginals; this is not an implication of the condition of greater covariance per se. In the next
section, we show that for n ≥ 3, greater weak association is not a diﬀerence-based ordering, though
Theorem 1 in Section 3 implies that for the special case of n = 2, it is.11
The greater weak association ordering has the desirable feature that (Y1,...,Yn) are weakly associ-
ated if and only if Y displays greater weak association than its “independent counterpart”, deﬁned
as the random vector X such that (X1,...Xn) are independent and, for each i, Xi and Yi have
the same distribution.12 It might seem tempting to deﬁne Y as displaying “greater association”
than X if Y and X have identical marginals and for all non-decreasing functions r and s deﬁned
on L, Cov(r(Y ),s(Y )) ≥ Cov(r(X),s(X)). However, such a deﬁnition would have the unappealing
consequence that an associated random vector Y would not necessarily display greater association
than its independent counterpart.13
10In the insurance literature, this ordering has been termed the “correlation order”— see Denuit et al. [21].
11To verify the claim for n = 2 directly, note that the only non-trivial partition of {1,2} into disjoint subsets
is {1}, {2}. Then given Deﬁnition 3’s requirement that Y and X have identical marginals, Cov(r(Y1),s(Y2)) −
Cov(r(X1),s(X2)) = E[r(Y1)s(Y2)]−E[r(X1)s(X2)], and the sign of the right-hand side depends only on the diﬀerence
between the distributions of Y and X.
12Similarly, (Y1,...,Yn) are negatively associated if and only if the independent counterpart of Y displays greater
weak association than Y .
13For the support {0,1,2}
2, let Pr(Y1 = Y2 = 0) = Pr(Y1 = Y2 = 1) = Pr(Y1 = Y2 = 2) =
1
4 and Pr(Y1 = 0,Y2 =
2) = Pr(Y1 = 2,Y2 = 0) =
1
8. Then it can be checked that Y is associated. However, consider the nondecreasing
functions r(Y1,Y2) = I{Y1≥1,Y2≥1} and s(Y1,Y2) = I{Y1=2orY2=2}. It is easy to conﬁrm that Cov(r(Y1,Y2),s(Y1,Y2))
is strictly smaller for Y than for its independent counterpart.
102.3 The Supermodular Ordering
For any z,v ∈ L, denote by z ∧ v the component-wise minimum (or “meet”) of z and v, i.e., the
element of L such that (z ∧ v)i = min{zi,vi} ∈ Li for all i ∈ N. Let z ∨ v similarly denote the
component-wise maximum (or “join”) of z,v. A function w is said to be supermodular (on L) if
w(z ∧ v) + w(z ∨ v) ≥ w(z) + w(v) for all z,v ∈ L. Supermodular functions are characterized by
the following property (see Topkis [52]):
w(z + ei + ej) + w(z) ≥ w(z + ei) + w(z + ej) (3)
for all i 6= j and z such that z + ei + ej is well-deﬁned (i.e., such that zi is not the upper bound of
Li and zj is not the upper bound of Lj).14
Definition 4 (Supermodular Ordering) Let the random vectors Y and X have distributions g and
f, respectively. The distribution g dominates the distribution f according to the supermodular
ordering, written g SPM f, if and only if E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all supermodular functions w.
It is clear from the deﬁnition that the supermodular ordering is a diﬀerence-based ordering.
To see most clearly the appeal of the supermodular ordering as an ordering of greater interde-
pendence, consider two distributions g and f such that, for some z ∈ L such that z + ei + ej is
well-deﬁned, the diﬀerence δ ≡ g − f satisﬁes
δ(z) = δ(z + ei + ej) = −δ(z + ei) = −δ(z + ej) = α (4)
for some α > 0, and such that δ(v) = 0 for all other nodes v of L. In such a case, we say the
distribution g is obtained from f by an elementary transformation (ET) of size α on L which leaves
unchanged the probability of all nodes other than z, z + ei, z + ej, and z + ei + ej and which
raises the probability of nodes z and z + ei + ej by the common amount α, while reducing the
probability of nodes z + ei and z + ej by the same amount. Intuitively, such ET’s increase the
degree of interdependence of a multivariate distribution, as for some pair of components i and j,
they make jointly high and jointly low realizations more likely, while making realizations where one
component is high and the other low less likely. Furthermore, they raise interdependence without
altering the marginal distribution of any component. From (3), a function w is supermodular if and
only if w · δ ≥ 0 for any δ of the form (4). Hence the class of supermodular functions is precisely
the class for which the expectation is raised by any ET as deﬁned in (4).
14For functions w deﬁned on R
n and twice diﬀerentiable, an equivalent characterization is: w is supermodular if
and only if
∂2w
∂zi∂zj ≥ 0 for all z ∈ R
n and all i 6= j.
11Meyer and Strulovici [42] use duality methods to characterize the supermodular ordering and
develop several constructive methods to implement this characterization. In their characterization,
the elementary transformations deﬁned above play a similar role to that of mean-preserving spreads
in Rothschild and Stiglitz [47] and Pigou-Dalton transfers in Atkinson [4] and Dasgupta, Sen, and
Starrett [20].15
A necessary condition for g SPM f is that g and f have identical univariate marginal distributions.
To see this, note that for any dimension i ∈ {1,...,n} and any k ∈ Li, the functions w(z) = I{zi≥k}
and w(z) = I{zi<k} are both supermodular. Therefore g SPM f implies that, for all i ∈ {1,...,n}
and any k ∈ Li,














and these inequalities together imply that g and f have identical univariate marginal distributions.
2.3.1 The Symmetric Supermodular Ordering
In many contexts, it is natural to assume that the supermodular objective functions being used to
compare distributions are symmetric with respect to the components of the random vectors. For
example, when the function w is an ex post welfare function deﬁned on the realized utilities of n
individuals, as in the assessment of ex post inequality under uncertainty, it is natural to assume
that welfare is invariant to permutations of a given n-vector of utilties over the individuals. We
now formally deﬁne the symmetric supermodular ordering.
Call a lattice L = ×n
i=1Li symmetric if Li = Lj for all i 6= j. Let θ denote a real function on
a symmetric lattice L. Depending on the context, θ can represent an objective function w or a
probability distribution f. We will say that the function θ is symmetric on L if θ(z) = θ(σ(z)) for
all z ∈ L and for all permutations σ(z) of z.
Definition 5 (Symmetric Supermodular Ordering) Let the random vectors Y and X have distri-
15Elementary transformations of bivariate distributions were also used by Epstein and Tanny [22] and Tchen [51]
to prove the equivalence, in two dimensions, of the supermodular and lower-orthant orderings for distributions with
identical marginals. Our deﬁnition of ET’s in the text is more restrictive, as it requires that the four points aﬀected
by the ET be adjacent points in the lattice; this more restrictive deﬁnition allows a much simpler proof of the two-
dimensional result and, more importantly, greatly facilitates the constructive methods for multivariate distributions
developed in Meyer and Strulovici [42].
12butions g and f, respectively, on a symmetric lattice. The distribution g dominates the distribution
f according to the symmetric supermodular ordering, written g SSPM f, if and only if
E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all symmetric supermodular functions w.
For an arbitrary (not necessarily symmetric) function θ, the symmetrized version of θ, θsymm, is







where Σ(n) is the set of all permutations of {1,...,n}. Importantly, if w is a supermodular function,
then wsymm is supermodular. For a symmetric supermodular function w, let Wsymm(w) denote the
set of supermodular functions ˆ w on L such that the symmetrized version of ˆ w is w, i.e., ˆ wsymm = w.
Note that {Wsymm(w)} is a partition of the set of all supermodular functions on the symmetric
lattice L. We can now state the following useful result:
Proposition 1 Given a pair of distributions g,f deﬁned on a symmetric lattice L, g SSPM
f ⇐⇒ gsymm SPM fsymm.
Proof. =⇒: If for all symmetric supermodular w, w·g ≥ w·f, then for all symmetric supermodular
w, w · gsymm ≥ w · fsymm. In turn, if for some symmetric supermodular w, w · gsymm ≥ w · fsymm,
then ˆ w · gsymm ≥ ˆ w · fsymm for all ˆ w ∈ Wsymm(w). Therefore, since {Wsymm(w)}w partitions the
set of all supermodular functions on L, w · gsymm ≥ w · fsymm for all symmetric supermodular w
implies that gsymm SPM fsymm.
⇐=: If for all supermodular w, w·gsymm ≥ w·fsymm, then for all supermodular w, wsymm·gsymm ≥
wsymm·fsymm. This is equivalent to wsymm·gsymm ≥ wsymm·fsymm for all symmetric supermodular
wsymm. This in turn implies that for all symmetric supermodular wsymm, wsymm · g ≥ wsymm · f.

Proposition 1 states that one can characterize the symmetric supermodular ordering in terms of
the supermodular order applied to symmetric distributions.
The symmetric supermodular ordering has a very simple form for random vectors for which each
component has a binary support {0,1}, so the lattice L = {0,1}n. To state the result, ﬁrst deﬁne,





13The “count function” c(Y ) gives the number of components of Y for which the realization takes
the value 1. Now recall the deﬁnition of the univariate convex ordering:
Definition 6 (Univariate Convex Ordering) For random variables Z and W with support S ⊆ R,
Z dominates V according to the convex ordering, written Z CX V , if Ew(Z) ≥ Ew(V ) for all
convex functions w : S → R.
Since w(z) = z and w(z) = −z are both convex functions, Z CX V implies EZ = EV . The
convex ordering is equivalent to the ordering of greater riskiness studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz
[47].
Proposition 2 For random vectors Y and X distributed on L = {0,1}n, Y SSPM X if and only
if c(Y ) CX c(X).
Proof. Any symmetric function w deﬁned on L = {0,1}n can be written as
w(Y1,...,Yn) = φ(c(Y1,...,Yn)), (7)
for some function φ : {0,1,...,n} → R. Furthermore, a symmetric function w on {0,1}n is
supermodular if and only if the function φ(·) in (7) is convex. 
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, we propose two new orderings of greater interdependence.
2.4 The Convex-Modular Ordering
In many contexts, the objective functions used to compare interdependence in multivariate dis-
tributions have the form w(z) = φ(r1(z1) + ... + rn(zn)), where φ(·) is convex and {ri}n
i=1 are
nondecreasing. We will term such functions “convex-modular”, as they take a convex transforma-
tion of a modular (i.e. additively separable) aggregate,
Pn
i=1 ri(zi). Any convex-modular function
is supermodular, and therefore the expectation of any convex-modular function is increased by any
elementary transformation of the form deﬁned in (4). The proof of Proposition 2 rested on the ob-





i=1 I{zi=1}. Convex-modular functions arise naturally in an insurance con-
text, where Z represents a vector of losses incurred by individuals 1,...,n, all of whom are insured
by a given insurer, and where the insurance contract of individual i obliges the insurer to pay
compensation ri(Zi), which would take the form ri(Zi) = min{mi,max{(1 − βi)(Zi − di),0}} for a
policy with a deductible di, a copayment rate βi for the insured, and a compensation limit mi. The
14total compensation paid out by the insurer is then
Pn
i=1 ri(Zi), and the insurer is concerned with
the riskiness of this total, so evaluates the cost of this payout using a convex objective function
φ.16 These observations motivate us to deﬁne the following diﬀerence-based ordering:
Definition 7 (Convex-Modular Ordering) Let the random vectors Y and X have distributions
g and f, respectively. The distribution g dominates the distribution f according to the convex-
modular ordering, written g CXMOD f, if and only if E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all convex-modular
functions w.
This deﬁnition is equivalent to the requirement that E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all functions w that
are nonnegative weighted sums of convex-modular functions. It follows from the deﬁnition that






Since w(z) = I{zi≥k} and w(z) = −I{zi≥k} are both convex-modular functions, it follows, from
the same logic as for the supermodular ordering, that Y CXMOD X implies that Y and X have
identical marginals.
It is natural to deﬁne a symmetric counterpart of the convex-modular ordering. It is clear from our
deﬁnition in (6) of the symmetrized version of a function, that if w is a convex-modular function,
then wsymm is a nonnegative weighted sum of convex-modular functions. Let CM∗ denote the
set of nonnegative weighted sums of convex-modular functions (where the dependence on a given
L is implicit). It follows from the above observation that CM∗ is closed under symmetrization
(although the set of convex-modular functions itself is not). As a consequence, we deﬁne the
symmetric convex-modular ordering as follows:
Definition 8 (Symmetric Convex-Modular Ordering) Let the random vectors Y and X have distri-
butions g and f, respectively, on a symmetric lattice. The distribution g dominates the distribution
f according to the symmetric convex-modular ordering, written g SCXMOD f, if and only
if E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all symmetric functions w ∈ CM∗.
As noted above, Y CXMOD X if and only if E[w|g] ≥ E[w|f] for all w ∈ CM∗. Using this
equivalence, it is then straightforward to adapt the proof of Proposition 1 to show:
Proposition 3 Given a pair of distributions g,f deﬁned on a symmetric lattice L, g SCXMOD
f ⇐⇒ gsymm CXMOD fsymm.
16See Denuit et al [21] for more details.
152.5 The Dispersion Ordering
Another notion of greater interdependence in Y than in X reﬂects the idea that the distribution
functions of the order statistics of Y should be “closer together” or less dispersed than the distri-
bution functions of the order statistics of X. To understand the link between dispersion of order
statistics and interdependence, suppose (Y1,Y2) and (X1,X2) both have symmetric distributions on
{0,1}2, and that Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(Xi = 1) = 1
2. Let Y1 and Y2 be perfectly positively dependent:
the realizations (0,0) and (1,1) both have probability 1
2. Let X1 and X2 be perfectly negatively
dependent: the realizations (0,1) and (1,0) both have probability 1
2. For the order statistics of Y ,
min{Y1,Y2} and max{Y1,Y2}, Pr(min{Y1,Y2} = 0) = Pr(max{Y1,Y2} = 0) = 1
2, so the two order
statistics have the same distribution. By contrast, for those of X, Pr(min{X1,X2} = 0) = 1 while
Pr(max{X1,X2} = 0) = 0, so the two order statistics have distributions as diﬀerent as possible in
this context. The qualitative lesson of this example is that for the more dependent random vector
Y , the distribution functions of the order statistics are more similar (less dispersed) than for X.
The majorization ordering of vectors can be used to formalize the notion of lower dispersion. A
vector a is said to be majorized by a vector b, written a ≺ b, if i) the components of the vectors
have the same total sum, and ii) for all k, the sum of the k largest entries of a is weakly smaller
than the sum of the k largest entries of b (see Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [28]). If a ≺ b, then
the components of a are less dispersed than the components of b.
Let Y(j) denote the jth order statistic of Y , i.e. the jth smallest value from (Y1,...,Yn), and deﬁne
X(j) similarly. Let FY(j) and FX(j) denote the c.d.f.’s of these order statistics. For random vectors
with symmetric distributions, Shaked and Tong [49] suggested the following dependence ordering.
Definition 9 (Symmetric Dispersion Ordering) For random vectors Y , X with symmetric dis-
tributions on a symmetric lattice L, the distribution of Y dominates that of X according to the
symmetric dispersion ordering, written Y SDISP X, if the distribution functions of the order
statistics of Y are less dispersed than the distribution functions of the order statistics of X, that is,
(FY(1)(b0),...,FY(n)(b0)) ≺ (FX(1)(b0),...,FX(n)(b0)) ∀b = (b0,...,b0) ∈ L. (8)
We now reformulate this dependence ordering in a manner which suggests a new ordering which is
both stronger and naturally applicable to asymmetric distributions. Each vector b = (b0,...,b0) ∈
L can be seen as generating a (componentwise) binary coarsening of the support of the random
vector Y from L to {0,1}n and a corresponding coarsened version of Y , Y b, such that Y b
i = 0 if
Yi ≤ b0 and Y b
i = 1 if Yi > b0. Let Y b
(j) denote the jth order statistic of Y b, i.e. the jth smallest value
16from (Y b
1 ,...,Y b
n) ∈ {0,1}n, and let FY b
(j) denote the distribution function of this order statistic.





(n)(0)) ∀b = (b0,...,b0) ∈ L. (9)
For asymmetric multivariate distributions, there is no particular reason to conﬁne attention to
binary coarsenings generated by vectors with equal components b = (b0,...,b0). Given a lattice
L = ×n
i=1Li with Li = {0,1,...,li − 1}, deﬁne the extended lattice ¯ L = ×n
i=1¯ Li, where ¯ Li =
{−1,0,1,...,li −1}. We now propose a new dependence ordering, which strengthens condition (9)
by requiring that it hold for every vector s = (s1,s2,...,sn) ∈ ¯ L.
For a random vector Y , deﬁne its (componentwise) binary coarsening corresponding to the vector
s ∈ ¯ L, Y s, by
Y s ≡ (Y s
1 ,...,Y s
n) ∈ {0,1}n where Y s
i =
(
0 if Yi ≤ si
1 if Yi > si.
Let (Y s
(1),...,Y s
(n)) ∈ {0,1}n denote the vector of order statistics of Y s, that is, Y s
(j) equals the jth
smallest value from (Y s
1 ,...,Y s
n). Thus, Y s
(j) = 0 if there are at least j values of i ∈ {1,...,n} such
that Yi ≤ si. Let FY s
(j) denote the distribution function of Y s
(j).17
Definition 10 (Dispersion Ordering) For random vectors Y ,X distributed on L, consider the set
of all binary coarsenings of Y and X, Y s and Xs, respectively, corresponding to some s ∈ ¯ L. The
distribution of Y dominates that of X according to the dispersion ordering, written Y DISP X,
if for all s ∈ ¯ L, the distribution functions of the order statistics of Y s are less dispersed than the





(n)(0)) ∀s ∈ ¯ L. (10)
The following proposition illuminates the appeal and convenience of the dispersion ordering by









17Considering coarsenings corresponding to every s in the extended lattice ¯ L allows us to include coarsened variables
Y
s for which Y
s
i = 1 with probability 1 for some component i. This makes the treatment of such coarsened variables
analogous to the treatment of coarsened variables Y
s for which Y
s
i = 0 with probability 1 for some i. Since the
deﬁnition of the SDISP ordering requires (8), or equivalently (9), to hold only for vectors b with equal components,
requiring it to hold for all b = (b0,...,b0) ∈ ¯ L would leave the deﬁnition eﬀectively unchanged, since it would add
only the trivial condition corresponding to b = (−1,...,−1), for which both vectors of distribution functions in (8)
are (0,...,0).
17which counts the number of components of Y s that equal 1, or equivalently, the number of compo-
nents of Y that strictly exceed the corresponding component of s.
Proposition 4 The following three conditions are equivalent:
i) For Y,X with support L, Y DISP X;
ii) For all s ∈ ¯ L, Y s SSPM Xs.
iii) For all s ∈ ¯ L, cs(Y s) CX cs(Xs).
Proof. Since for any s, Y s and Xs have support {0,1}n, the equivalence of ii) and iii) follows
from Proposition 2 in Section 2.3.1. To show that ii) implies i), ﬁrst note that since Y s
(j) is the jth
smallest value from (Y s
1 ,...,Y s
n), FY s
(j)(0) = Pr(Y s
(j) = 0) = E[I{Y s
(j)=0}] is weakly decreasing in j.

















 ∀k ∈ {1,...,n}, ∀s ∈ ¯ L, (12)










(1 − I{cs(Y s)≥n−(j−1)})
= k − max{cs(Y s) − (n − k),0}. (13)
Since for any s ∈ ¯ L, cs(Y s) is a symmetric function of Y s, and max{z −a,0} is convex in z for any
a ∈ R, max{cs(Y s)−(n−k),0} is a symmetric supermodular function of Y s for all k ∈ {1,...,n}.




(j)=0} = n − cs(Y s), (14)
and since both cs(Y s) and −cs(Y s) are symmetric supermodular functions of Y s, ii) implies that
for k = n, (12) holds with equality, as required. Thus ii) implies i).
To show that i) implies iii), ﬁrst note that for random variables Z and V with support {0,1,...,n},
Z CX V if and only if E(Z) = E(V ) and, for all a ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, E[max{Z − a,0}] ≥
E[max{V −a,0}].18 Given (14), the equality in (12) for k = n implies that E(cs(Y s)) = E(cs(Xs)).
18See, for example, Jewitt [32] and Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [27].
18Given (13), the weak inequality in (12) for k ∈ {1,...,n−1} implies that E[max{cs(Y s)−a,0}] ≥
E[max{cs(Xs) − a,0}] for all a ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. Hence for all s ∈ ¯ L, cs(Y s) CX cs(Xs). 
Proposition 4 provides a simple interpretation of the dispersion ordering for random vectors Y
and X. Consider any coarsening of the support L = ×n
i=1Li into {0,1}n generated by, for each
dimension i, classifying all values zi ≤ si as 0 and all values zi > si as 1, for some s ∈ ¯ L. Then
compare the distributions of the correspondingly coarsened random vectors Y s and Xs according
to the symmetric supermodular ordering, or equivalently, given Proposition 2, use the univariate
convex ordering to compare the distributions of the random variables cs(Y s) and cs(Xs) counting,
respectively, the number of components of Y and of X such that Yi > si and Xi > si. Y DISP X
if and only if, for any point s in the support,
Pn
i=1 I{Yi>si} is riskier than
Pn
i=1 I{Xi>si} in the sense
of Rothschild and Stiglitz [47].
A natural application of the dispersion ordering is to the assessment of systemic risk in ﬁnancial
systems, where the n dimensions represent banks and where a bank’s ﬁnancial health is often
summarized by classifying it as either solvent or insolvent. The degree of interdependence in
failures of ﬁnancial institutions is of crucial importance because “as more banks fail in the same
time period, the economic disruption tends to increase disproportionately” (Beale et al [8, p.1]).
This disproportionate increase in cost, representing an aversion to positive interdependence, can
be captured by a systemic cost function φ(k), where k is the number of banks that fail and φ :
{0,1,...,n} → R is convex. It is natural to want comparisons of expected systemic cost to be
robust to uncertainty about the precise values of the failure thresholds for diﬀerent banks. These
considerations point towards using the dispersion ordering of the random vectors describing banks’
returns to compare levels of systemic risk under diﬀerent regulatory scenarios.
It is apparent from Proposition 4 that the dispersion ordering is a diﬀerence-based ordering. Fur-
thermore, if Y DISP X, then Y and X have identical univariate marginals. To see this, ﬁrst take
s ∈ ¯ L to be a vector with ith component equal to a ∈ Li and all other components equal to -1.
Then for any Y and X and for any j 6= i, Y s
j = Xs
j = 1. Hence for k = 1, (12) can be rewritten as
E[I{Y s
(1)=0}] ≤ E[I{Xs
(1)=0}] ⇐⇒ Pr(Yi ≤ a) ≤ Pr(Xi ≤ a).
Now take s to be a vector with ith component equal to a ∈ Li and all other components equal to
li − 1. Then for any Y and X and for any j 6= i, Y s
j = Xs
j = 0. Hence it follows from the equality
in (12) for k = n and the inequality for k = n − 1 that
E[I{Y s
(n)=0}] ≥ E[I{Xs
(n)=0}] ⇐⇒ Pr(Yi ≤ a) ≥ Pr(Xi ≤ a).
Therefore, for all i and for all a ∈ Li, Pr(Yi ≤ a) = Pr(Xi ≤ a).
19An important advantage of the dispersion ordering, relative to the greater weak association, super-
modular, and convex-modular orderings, is that it is straightforward to check whether or not any
two n-dimensional random vectors Y and X can be ranked according to the dispersion ordering. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 4, checking whether or not, for a given s ∈ ¯ L, cs(Y s) CX cs(Xs)
is equivalent to checking whether or not a set of n − 1 inequalities and 1 equality hold. Hence, by
Proposition 4, to check whether or not Y DISP X, it is suﬃcient to check a set of n+1 inequalities
for each s ∈ ¯ L.19
2.6 The Concordance Ordering
Another intuitively appealing notion of greater interdependence, the concordance ordering, has
been formalized for multivariate distributions by Joe [34].
Definition 11 (Concordance Ordering) Let the random vectors Y and X have distributions g and
f, respectively. The distribution g dominates the distribution f according to the concordance
ordering, written g CONC f, if and only if
Pr(Y ≥ z) ≥ Pr(X ≥ z) and Pr(Y ≤ z) ≥ Pr(X ≤ z) ∀z ∈ L.
For any node in the support, the concordance ordering requires that the components of Y be more
likely to be all higher than at that node, relative to those of X, and also more likely to be all lower
than at that node, relative to those of X.
It is easy to see that the concordance ordering is a diﬀerence-based ordering. As is well known,
Y CONC X implies that Y and X have identical univariate marginals.20
The concordance ordering shares with our dispersion ordering the advantage of being easily check-
able; it is clear from the deﬁnition that for any number of dimensions, it is suﬃcient to check, for
each point in the support, whether two inequalities are satisﬁed.21
19In practice, several of the inequalities generated as s varies will hold trivially or be redundant. For example,
for L = {0,1}
2, so ¯ L = {−1,0,1}
2, the 3 × 3 × 3 inequalities that in principle need to be checked reduce to only
5, corresponding to the requirements that i) (Y1,Y2) and (X1,X2) have identical marginals (4 inequalities) and ii)
Pr(Y1 = 0,Y2 = 0) ≥ Pr(X1 = 0,X2 = 0).
20To see this, ﬁrst take z ∈ L to be a vector with i
th component equal to a and all other components 0. Then
Pr(Y ≥ z) ≥ Pr(X ≥ z) becomes Pr(Yi ≥ a) ≥ Pr(Xi ≥ a). Similarly, taking z to be a vector with i
th component
equal to a−1 and all other components equal to li −1, Pr(Y ≤ z) ≥ Pr(X ≤ z) becomes Pr(Yi ≤ a−1) ≥ Pr(Xi ≤
a − 1). Hence, for all i and a ∈ Li, Pr(Yi ≥ a) = Pr(Xi ≥ a), so Y and X have identical marginals.
21As with the dispersion ordering, in practice some of the inequalities will hold trivially or be redundant. For
L = {0,1}
2, the 2 × 2 × 2 inequalities that in principle need to be checked reduce to the same 5 as for the dispersion
203 Relationships among the Orderings
We are now in a position to present our main results, which establish the relationships among the
orderings of interdependence deﬁned in Section 2.
Theorem 1 (Orderings: Two Dimensions) For two dimensions, the following orderings are
equivalent: greater weak association, supermodular ordering, convex-modular ordering, dispersion
ordering, and concordance ordering.
Proof. The equivalence for n = 2 between greater weak association, the supermodular ordering,
and the concordance ordering is well known (see Meyer [39, Prop. 2] and M¨ uller and Stoyan [45,
Theorem 3.8.2] for references). We now prove that for n = 2 the convex-modular and dispersion
orderings are equivalent to the other three orderings, by showing that Y SPM X =⇒ Y CXMOD
X =⇒ Y DISP X =⇒ Y CONC X.
Since every convex-modular function is supermodular, the supermodular ordering implies the
convex-modular ordering. The fact that the convex-modular ordering implies the dispersion order-
ing follows from the proof of Proposition 4 and the facts that the functions max{cs(Y )−(2−k),0},
for k ∈ {1,2}, and −cs(Y ) are both convex-modular. Finally, observe that by Proposition 4, if
(Y1,Y2) DISP (X1,X2), then for all s ∈ ¯ L, Pr(cs(Y s) = 0) ≥ Pr(cs(Xs) = 0) and Pr(cs(Y s) =
2) ≥ Pr(cs(Xs) = 2). The ﬁrst of these inequalities is equivalent to Pr(Y1 ≤ s1,Y2 ≤ s2) ≥
Pr(X1 ≤ s1,X2 ≤ s2), while the second is equivalent to Pr(Y1 > s1,Y2 > s2) ≥ Pr(X1 > s1,X2 >
s2). Hence (Y1,Y2) DISP (X1,X2) implies (Y1,Y2) CONC (X1,X2). 
Theorem 2 (Orderings: Three or More Dimensions) a) For n ≥ 3, greater weak asso-
ciation is strictly stronger than the supermodular ordering, which is strictly stronger than the
convex-modular ordering, which is strictly stronger than the dispersion ordering, which is at
least as strong as the concordance ordering.
b) For n = 3, the dispersion ordering is equivalent to the concordance ordering, whereas for
n > 3, the dispersion ordering is strictly stronger than the concordance ordering.
Proof. i) The proof that Y GWA X implies Y SPM X is in Appendix A. The following
example (which for future reference we label Example 1) proves that this implication is strict:
Let L = {0,1}3 and let X and Y have distributions f and g, respectively. Let f(x) = 1
3 if
P3








21the values 0,1,2,3, respectively. For these symmetric distributions, Propositions 1 and 2 together
imply that g SPM f on L = {0,1}3 if and only if c(Y ) CX c(X) on {0,1,2,3}. It is easily
checked that Ec(Y ) = Ec(X), Pr(c(Y ) = 3) ≥ Pr(c(X) = 3), and Pr(c(Y ) = 0) ≥ Pr(c(X) = 0),




11 < 0, while Cov(r(X1),s(X2,X3)) = 0, so g GWA f does not
hold.
ii) Since every convex-modular function is supermodular, Y SPM X implies Y CXMOD X. We
show that the implication is strict by providing, in Appendix B, an example of a supermodular
function on L = {0,1,2}3 which cannot be written as a nonnegative weighted sum of convex-
modular functions.
iii) That Y CXMOD X implies Y DISP X follows from the proof of Proposition 4 and the facts
that the functions max{cs(Y )−(n−k),0}, for k ∈ {1,...,n}, and −cs(Y ) are both convex-modular.
The following example (labeled Example 2 for future reference) proves that this implication is strict:
Let L = {0,1,2} × {0,1} × {0,1}. Since both the convex-modular and the dispersion ordering
are diﬀerence-based orderings, it is suﬃcient to specify δ ≡ g − f, the diﬀerence between the
distributions of Y and X. Let δ(z1,z2,z3) =  > 0 if
P3
i=1 zi is even and δ(z1,z2,z3) = − < 0
if
P3
i=1 zi is odd. It is easily checked that Y CONC X. As proved in part iv) of the proof
below, for n = 3, Y CONC X ⇔ Y DISP X. However, for the convex-modular function
w(z) = max{(
P3
i=1 zi) − 2,0}, we have w · (g − f) = − < 0, so Y CXMOD X does not hold.
iv) To show that Y DISP X implies Y CONC X, observe that, for k = 1, the left-hand side
of (12) can be rewritten as E[I{Y s
(1)=0}] = 1 − Pr(Yi > si ∀i). Therefore, (12) implies that for all
s ∈ ¯ L, Pr(Y > s) ≥ Pr(X > s). Similarly, it follows from the equality in (12) for k = n and the
inequality for k = n − 1 that, for all s ∈ ¯ L, E[I{Y s
(n)=0}] ≥ E[I{Xs
(n)=0}], which implies that for all
s ∈ L, Pr(Y ≤ s) ≥ Pr(X ≤ s). Hence Y CONC X.
Now we show that for n = 3, Y CONC X implies Y DISP X. First, for any s ∈ ¯ L, showing that







and this is true, since Y CONC X implies that Y and X have identical marginal distributions.
Given the equality in (12) for k = 3, it remains to show that for all s ∈ ¯ L,
E[I{Y s
(1)=0}] ≤ E[I{Xs
(1)=0}] and E[I{Y s
(3)=0}] ≥ E[I{Xs
(3)=0}].
22The ﬁrst of these inequalities is equivalent to Pr(Y > s) ≥ Pr(X > s) and the second to Pr(Y ≤
s) ≥ Pr(X ≤ s), as shown above in the proof that Y DISP X implies Y CONC X. Therefore,
both inequalities follow from Y CONC X.
The following example (labeled for future reference Example 3) proves that for n > 3, Y CONC X
does not imply Y DISP X: Let L = {0,1}4, let g,f represent the distributions of Y,X, and let
δ(z1,z2,z3,z4) ≡ g − f =  > 0 if
P4
i=1 zi is even and δ(z1,z2,z3,z4) = − < 0 if
P4
i=1 zi is odd.
Again, it is easily checked that Y CONC X. For s = (0,0,0,0), consider the convex function of
cs(z) deﬁned by w = max{cs(z) − 2,0}. We have w · (g − f) = −2 < 0, so by Proposition 4,
Y DISP X does not hold. 
Remark 1: Given the close relationship shown by Proposition 4 between the dispersion ordering
and the symmetric supermodular ordering, and given that both are strictly weaker than the super-
modular ordering, it is natural to ask how these two orderings relate to each other. For arbitrary
supports, neither implies the other; however, as we note in Section 4, in the special case of binary
random variables, the dispersion ordering is strictly stronger than the symmetric supermodular
ordering.
To conﬁrm that for arbitrary supports, Y DISP X does not imply Y SSPM X, consider Example
2, used in part iii) of the proof of Theorem 2. Expand the support from L = {0,1,2}×{0,1}×{0,1}
to the symmetric L0 = {0,1,2}3. For z ∈ L0 \ L, let δ(z) ≡ g − f = 0 and for z ∈ L, deﬁne δ(z)
as in Example 2. Then Y DISP X but, for the symmetric supermodular function w deﬁned in
Example 2, w · δ = w · (g − f) = − < 0, so Y SSPM X does not hold.
To conﬁrm that Y SSPM X does not imply Y DISP X, consider Y,X with distributions g,f,
respectively, on L = {0,1}3 such that δ = g − f is given by δ(0,0,0) = 0, δ(z1,z2,z3) =  > 0 if
P3
i=1 zi = 1, δ(1,1,0) = −4, δ(0,1,1) = δ(1,0,1) = −, and δ(1,1,1) = 3. It is easy to check that
for k = 0,1,2,3, Pr(c(Y ) = k)−Pr(c(X) = k) = 0,3,−6,3, respectively, so c(Y ) CX c(X) and
hence Y SSPM X. However, P(Y1 = 1) − P(X1 = 1) < 0, hence Y and X do not have identical
marginals, and therefore Y DISP X does not hold.
Remark 2: For n ≥ 3, the strongest of our interdependence orderings, greater weak association, is
not a diﬀerence-based ordering. To show this, we extend Example 1, used in part i) of the proof
of Theorem 2. For L = {0,1}3, f(x) = 1
3 if
P3











i=1 xi = 0, ˜ f(x) = 1
6 if
P3






i=1 yi takes the values 0,1,2,3, respectively. By construction, ˜ g − ˜ f = g − f,
23and we showed in part i) of the proof of Theorem 2 that g GWA f does not hold. Yet (see
Appendix C) ˜ g GWA ˜ f. Hence for n ≥ 3, greater weak association is not diﬀerence-based. Since
the supermodular ordering is diﬀerence-based and the distributions in this example are symmetric,
it follows that even for symmetric distributions, greater weak association is strictly stronger than
the supermodular ordering whenever n ≥ 3.
4 Binary Random Variables
In many economic contexts, the random variables whose interdependence is to be assessed are
binary. Theoretical models often focus on binary action spaces or binary outcome spaces for
tractability. For example, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson’s [14] study of the eﬀects of social net-
works on interdependence in individuals’ employment outcomes suppressed wage variation among
employed workers and focused only on whether workers were employed or unemployed. Experi-
mental studies often focus on binary choice spaces to simplify the subjects’ decision problems as
well as to simplify the data analysis. For example, Choi, Gale, and Kariv [19], in their experimen-
tal study of the eﬀect of network structure on social learning and the resulting interdependence
among agents’ decisions, focused on a decision environment with only two states of the world, two
signals, and two possible actions. In empirical work, for example on multidimensional inequality,
binary classiﬁcations, such as whether or not income is below the poverty line or whether or not
an individual is literate, are often inevitable features of the data.
Binary random variables, besides being common, also help to illuminate the structure of and
relationships among the interdependence orderings. This section studies a variety of special cases
with binary random variables. Our aims are to highlight both i) equivalences among the orderings
that arise in these special cases and ii) easily checkable and easily interpretable necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the orderings to hold.
4.1 Symmetric Distributions or Symmetric Objective Functions
The following result is valid for any number n of dimensions.
Proposition 5 a) For random vectors Y and X with symmetric distributions on L = {0,1}n,
the following conditions are equivalent:
i) Y SPM X;
24ii) Y CXMOD X;
iii) Y DISP X;
iv) Y SDISP X;
v) c(Y ) CX c(X).
b) For random vectors Y and X distributed on L = {0,1}n, the following conditions are equiva-
lent:
i) Y SSPM X;
ii) Y SCXMOD X;
iii) c(Y ) CX c(X).
Proof. a) It is clear from Deﬁnitions 9 and 10 that Y DISP X implies Y SDISP X. It follows
from Deﬁnition 9 and Proposition 4 that for symmetric distributions on L = {0,1}n, Y SDISP X
if and only if c(Y ) CX c(X)—the only non-trivial choice of b = (b0,...,b0) in Deﬁnition 9 is
(0,...,0), in which case (8) coincides with c(Y ) CX c(X). But Propositions 1 and 2 together
imply that for symmetric distributions on L = {0,1}n, Y SPM X if and only if c(Y ) CX c(X).
The remaining equivalences then follow from Theorem 2.
b) The equivalence of Y SSPM X and c(Y ) CX c(X) on L = {0,1}n is shown in Proposition
2. Since every symmetric w ∈ CM∗ is supermodular, i) implies ii). Since c(Y ) is symmetric and
convex-modular, ii) implies iii). 
For random vectors on L = {0,1}n with asymmetric distributions, the dispersion ordering is strictly
stronger than the three orderings shown to be equivalent in part b) of Proposition 5. With s =
(0,0,...,0), the majorization condition (10) deﬁning Y DISP X is equivalent to c(Y ) CX c(X),
but other choices of s generate additional conditions. In particular, as shown in Section 2.5,
Y DISP X implies that Y and X have identical marginals, whereas this is not an implication of
the three orderings in part b) of Proposition 5.22
4.2 Three Dimensions
Proposition 6 For random vectors Y and X distributed on L = {0,1}3, the following conditions
are equivalent:
22The second example in Remark 1 following Theorem 2 is one for which L = {0,1}
3 and Y SSPM X, but Y and
X do not have identical marginals, so Y DISP X does not hold.
25i) Y SPM X;
ii) Y CXMOD X;
iii) Y DISP X;
iv) Y CONC X;
v) c(Y ) CX c(X); Y and X have identical marginals; and for all i 6= j, Pr(Yi = Yj) ≥ Pr(Xi =
Xj).
Proof. All of the orderings in the proposition are diﬀerence-based orderings, so it is suﬃcient
to work with δ ≡ g − f. For L = {0,1}3, the values of δ at each of the 8 nodes are displayed in
Figure 1a. Each of conditions i)-v) implies that Y and X have identical marginals. This in turn
implies that once the 4 values of δ(1,1,1) ≡ a, δ(0,1,1) ≡ b1, δ(1,0,1) ≡ b2, and δ(1,1,0) ≡ b3
are speciﬁed (corresponding to the 4 nodes marked with black dots in Figure 1a), the remaining 4
values are determined. Given identical marginals, Y CONC X if and only if
a ≥ 0, a + bk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1,2,3}, and 2a +
3 X
i=1
bi ≥ 0. (15)
In (15), the ﬁrst and third inequalities are equivalent, respectively, to
Pr(c(Y ) = 3) ≥ Pr(c(X) = 3) and Pr(c(Y ) = 0) ≥ Pr(c(X) = 0).
The inequality a + bk ≥ 0 is equivalent to Pr(Yi = Yj = 1) ≥ Pr(Xi = Xj = 1), which, given
identical marginals, is equivalent to Pr(Yi = Yj) ≥ Pr(Yi = Yj). Hence conditions iv) and v) are
26equivalent. We now provide a simple constructive proof that:
For L = {0,1}3, Y CONC X implies Y SPM X. (16)
This, in conjunction with Theorem 2, will complete the proof.
Our constructive proof of (16) decomposes δ into 6 elementary transformations (ET’s) of the form
deﬁned in (4): for each of the 6 faces of the cube L = {0,1}3, there is one ET involving the 4 nodes
on that face.23 Using the labels for the nodes in Figure 1b, let the ET involving nodes A, Bi, Bj,
and Ck have size αij, and the ET involving nodes Bk, Ci, Cj, and D have size αij. It is easily
checked that these 6 ET’s sum to δ if and only if




















It is apparent by inspection that the equations (17) are satisﬁed and that, if the inequalities (15)
deﬁning the concordance ordering here hold, then for all i 6= j, αij ≥ 0 and αij ≥ 0. Thus,
g CONC f implies the existence of a sequence of nonnegative ET’s that sum to g − f. Since each
ET raises the expectation of any supermodular function, it follows that g SPM f. 
4.3 Four Dimensions and “Top-to-Bottom” Symmetry
The equivalence demonstrated in Proposition 6 for the three-dimensional cube between the super-
modular ordering and the concordance ordering breaks down if we increase either i) the number of
dimensions, as shown by Example 3 (used in part iv) of the proof of Theorem 2), or ii) the number
of points in the support for any random variable, as shown by Example 2 (used in part iii) of the
same proof). Nevertheless, some interesting equivalences do persist in higher dimensions, and can
be demonstrated using a similar constructive method of proof.
Consider four-dimensional random vectors with support L = {0,1}4, and assume now that their
distributions satisfy a symmetry condition we term “top-to-bottom symmetry”. We say that the
distribution of a random vector Z satisﬁes top-to-bottom symmetry if for any a ∈ {0,1}4, P(Z =
a) = P(Z = (1,1,1,1) − a). Top-to-bottom symmetry arises naturally in a variety of settings. We
give two examples: matching with frictions and social learning in networks.
23Hu, Xie, and Ruan [31, pp. 188-9] proved (16) in a very indirect manner using the tool of “majorization with
respect to weighted trees”.
27In a matching context, suppose the four dimensions represent managers, supervisors, workers,
and ﬁrms, and suppose that for each dimension, there is one representative (individual or ﬁrm)
with high quality (zi = 1) and one with low quality (zi = 0). Production requires forming a
“team” consisting of exactly one manager, one supervisor, one worker, and one ﬁrm, and the
output of such a team is a supermodular function of the qualities of each of its four components.
Supermodularity of the production function implies that it would be output-maximizing for the
four high-quality individuals/ﬁrm to be matched and for the four low-quality individuals/ﬁrm to be
matched. However, informational frictions may prevent such an outcome being reached and cause
the matching process to be stochastic. Nevertheless, as long as the stochastic process is certain
to generate two teams, each consisting of one representative from each dimension, the distribution
over teams satisﬁes “top-to-bottom symmetry”.
Choi, Gale, and Kariv [19] experimentally investigate the eﬀect of network structure on the de-
gree of interdependence of behavior in social learning situations. To simplify the computation of
equilibrium behavior, they work with an environment that is symmetric with respect to the two
possible states of the world, signals, and actions. As a result, in each period and for any network,
the predicted distributions over agents’ actions satisfy “top-to-bottom symmetry”.
Proposition 7 For random vectors Y and X with distributions on L = {0,1}4 that satisfy “top-
to-bottom symmetry”, the following conditions are equivalent:
i) Y SPM X;
ii) Y CXMOD X;
iii) Y DISP X;
iv) c(Y ) CX c(X) and for all i 6= j, Pr(Yi = Yj) ≥ Pr(Xi = Xj).
The proof, which is in Appendix D, has a similar structure to that of Proposition 6. For δ ≡ g −f,
we apply the deﬁnition of the dispersion ordering, for each s ∈ ¯ L, and show that when L = {0,1}4
and the distributions satisfy top-to-bottom symmetry, Y DISP X if and only if the two conditions
listed in iv) hold. (Top-to-bottom symmetry itself ensures that Y and X have identical marginal
distributions.) We then adapt the construction used to prove Proposition 6 to show that if the
conditions in iv) hold, then there exists a sequence of nonnegative ET’s that sum to g − f. Since
each ET raises the expectation of any supermodular function, it follows that g SPM f and hence,
by Theorem 2, conditions i)-iv) in Proposition 7 are all equivalent.
28Even though, in the environment of Proposition 7, the SPM, CXMOD, and DISP orderings are
equivalent, we can show by example that the GWA ordering is strictly stronger and the concordance
ordering strictly weaker.24
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examined ﬁve orderings of interdependence for multivariate distributions and
described a range of economic contexts in which these orderings are applicable, including multidi-
mensional inequality comparisons, assessments of ex post inequality under uncertainty, valuations
of portfolios of assets or insurance policies, and assessments of systemic risk in ﬁnancial systems.
While greater weak association, the supermodular ordering, and the concordance ordering have
received some attention in the statistics and economics literatures, this paper introduces the dis-
persion ordering and the convex-modular ordering. Our dispersion ordering is motivated by the
link between greater interdependence in random vectors and lower dispersion of the cdf’s of their
order statistics, and we proved that greater interdependence for Y than for X according to the
dispersion ordering corresponds to greater riskiness, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [47], of
the summary statistic
Pn
i=1 I{Yi>si} compared to
Pn
i=1 I{Xi>si}, for any point (s1,...,sn) in the
support. Similarly, Y is more interdependent than X according to the convex-modular ordering
if for any choice of {ri}n
i=1 nondecreasing, the aggregate
Pn
i=1 ri(Yi) is riskier than
Pn
i=1 ri(Xi).
While in two dimensions, all ﬁve orderings are equivalent (Theorem 1), for an arbitrary number
of dimensions n > 2, Theorem 2 showed that the ﬁve orderings are strictly ranked. For multi-
variate random vectors each of whose components are binary, we demonstrated some equivalences
among the orderings and provided easily checkable and easily interpretable necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the orderings to hold. For arbitrary multivariate distributions, we emphasized that
the dispersion and concordance orderings have the advantage, relative to the other three, of being
checkable pointwise.
24To show that the GWA ordering is strictly stronger, let X have a uniform distribution on {0,1}
4 and let Y
be obtained from X by two ET’s as deﬁned in (4), each of size α ∈ (0,
1
16), one involving (0,0,1,1), (1,0,1,1),
(0,1,1,1), and (1,1,1,1) and the other involving (0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0), (0,1,0,0), and (1,1,0,0). Both Y and X
satisfy top-to-bottom symmetry, and by construction, Y SPM X. However, for r(z1,z2,z3) = I{z1+z2+z3≥2} and
s(z4) = I{z4=1}, Cov(r(Y1,Y2,Y3),s(Y4)) < 0 = Cov(r(X1,X2,X3),s(X4)), so Y GWA X does not hold. To
show that the concordance ordering is strictly weaker, recall Example 3, which was used in part iv) of the proof of
Theorem 2. In that example, δ = g −f satisﬁes top-to-bottom symmetry, and as we showed, Y CONC X holds but
Y DISP X does not.
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31Appendices
A Proof that Y GWA X implies Y SPM X
This proof builds on Cristoﬁdes and Vaggelatou’s [18] proof that if (Y1,...,Yn) is weakly associated,
then (Y1,...,Yn) dominates its independent counterpart according to the supermodular ordering.
First, we deﬁne a new random vector Z that has the same distribution as X and is independent of
Y . We then show by induction that Y SPM Z and hence Y SPM X.
For n = 2, the result is proved in the references cited in the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that it




















E[w(i,Z2,...,Zm|Y1 = i)]Pr(Y1 = i) (21)
= Ew(Y1,Z2,...,Zm).
The equality in (19) uses the independence of Z from Y , and that in (20) the assumption that Y and
X, hence Y and Z, have identical marginal distributions (along with the fact that E[w(i,Y2,...,Ym)]
is a univariate function of i). The inequality follows by applying the induction hypothesis for each
value of i. The equality in (21) uses the independence of Z from Y .
Now we show that for all supermodular w,
Ew(Y1,Y2,...,Ym) − Ew(Z1,Z2,...,Zm) ≥ Ew(Z1,Y2,...,Ym) − Ew(Y1,Z2,...,Zm),


















































Cov(I{Z1>i},w(i + 1,Z2,...,Zm) − w(i,Z2,...,Zm)))
= Ew(Z1,Z2,...,Zm) − Ew(Y1,Z2,...,Zm). (24)
The equality in (22) uses the independence of Z from Y , and that in (23) the assumption that Y
and X, hence Y and Z, have identical marginal distributions. The inequality holds since i) I{Y1>i}
is an increasing function of Y1; ii) (w(i+1,Y2,...,Ym)−w(i,Y2,...,Ym)) is an increasing function
of (Y2,...,Ym) since w is supermodular; and iii) by hypothesis, Y GWA X and hence Y GWA Z.
The equality in (24) follows from the logic of the ﬁrst four equalities. 
B Proof that for n ≥ 3, the supermodular ordering is strictly stronger than the convex-
modular ordering
Since every convex-modular function is supermodular, Y SPM X implies Y CXMOD X. We show
that the implication is strict by providing an example of a supermodular function on L = {0,1,2}3
which cannot be written as a nonnegative weighted sum of convex-modular ones:
Deﬁne w as follows: w(2,2,2) = 3, w(2,2,1) = w(2,1,2) = w(1,2,2) = 2,w(2,2,0) = w(2,0,2) =
w(0,2,2) = 1, w(2,1,1) = w(1,2,1) = w(1,1,2) = 1, w(0,2,1) = 1, and w(z) = 0 for all other
nodes z ∈ L. We ﬁrst show that this function w(x) is not itself convex-modular. Suppose it were.
Then clearly the function φ(·) would have to take values in {0,1,2,3}. If
P3
i=1 ri(xi) were strictly
larger at (0,2,2) than at (0,2,1), then φ(·) would not be convex, since φ(·) would rise from 0 to 1
but then remain constant at 1 even though
P3
i=1 ri(xi) increased. If, instead,
P3
i=1 ri(xi) took on
33the same value at (0,2,2) as at (0,2,1), then since
P3
i=1 ri(xi) is modular (additively separable) in
the xi’s, it would follow that
P3
i=1 ri(xi) took on the same value at (1,2,2) as at (1,2,1). However,
w(1,2,2) = 2 > 1 = w(1,2,1). Thus, we reach a contradiction, so w(z) as deﬁned above is not
convex-modular.
In Meyer and Strulovici [42], we show how, for any ﬁnite support L, the “double description
method”, conceptualized by Motzkin et al [44], can be used to determine the extreme rays of the
cone of supermodular functions on L. For L = {0,1,2}3, we show there that the function w deﬁned
above is an extreme ray of the cone of supermodular functions and hence cannot be non-trivially
expressed as a nonnegative weighted sum of supermodular functions. This, combined with the fact
that it is not itself convex-modular, shows that it cannot be expressed as a nonnegative weighted
sum of convex-modular functions.
C Proof that in example in Remark 2 (Section 3), ˜ g GWA ˜ f
Since ˜ f and ˜ g are symmetric distributions, all partitions of {Z1,Z2,Z3} into disjoint sets {Zi}
and {Zj,Zk} will yield the same covariances. As is well known, any nondecreasing functions on
L = {0,1}3 can be written as nonnegative weighted combinations of indicator functions, so it is
suﬃcient to focus on functions r,s that are nondecreasing indicator functions. Take r(z1) = I{z1=1}.
If s(z2,z3) is a function of only z2 or only z3, then Cov(r(Y1),s(Y2,Y3) ≥ Cov(r(X1),s(X2,X3))
follows from the facts that i) ˜ g − ˜ f = g − f, where g,f are deﬁned in Example 1; ii) g SPM f
and the supermodular ordering is a diﬀerence-based order, so ˜ g SPM ˜ f; and iii) by Theorem 1,
for n = 2, the greater weak association and supermodular orderings are equivalent.
It remains only to consider s(z2,z3) = I{z2=z3=1} and s(z2,z3) = I{z2+z3≥1}. For s(z2,z3) =
I{z2=z3=1}, Cov(r(Y1),s(Y2,Y3)) − Cov(r(X1),s(X2,X3)) = 0, while for s(z2,z3) = I{z2+z3≥1},
Cov(r(Y1),s(Y2,Y3)) > 0 > Cov(r(X1),s(X2,X3)). Therefore, ˜ g GWA ˜ f.
D Proof of Proposition 7
Since the SPM, CXMOD, and DISP orderings are all diﬀerence-based orderings, it is suﬃcient to
work with δ ≡ g −f. Figure 2 displays the values of δ at each of the 16 nodes of L = {0,1}4, given
top-to-bottom symmetry of g and f, and hence of δ. Top-to-bottom symmetry of δ implies that once
the 8 values of δ(1,1,1,1) ≡ a, δ(0,1,1,1) ≡ b1, δ(1,0,1,1) ≡ b2, δ(1,1,0,1) ≡ b3, δ(1,1,1,0) ≡ b4,
δ(0,1,1,0) ≡ c14, δ(1,0,1,0) ≡ c24, and δ(1,1,0,0) ≡ c34 are speciﬁed (corresponding to the 8 nodes
marked with black dots in Figure 2), the remaining 8 values are determined. Now c(Y ) CX c(X)
corresponds to a ≥ 0 and 2a +
P4
i=1 bi ≥ 0, while Pr(Yi = Yj) ≥ Pr(Xi = Xj) for all i 6= j
corresponds to a + bi + bj + cij ≥ 0 for all i 6= j. Note that top-to-bottom symmetry of δ implies
34that c12 = c34, c13 = c24, and c23 = c14.
We ﬁrst show that conditions iii) and iv) in the proposition are equivalent. For s = (0,0,0,0),
Y DISP X implies a ≥ 0 and 2a+
P4
i=1 bi ≥ 0; for s = (1,0,0,0) and all permutations thereof, it
implies a+bi ≥ 0 for all i; for s = (1,1,0,0) and all permutations thereof, it implies a+bi+bj+cij ≥ 0
for all i 6= j; and for s = (1,1,1,0) and all permutations thereof, it implies that X and Y have
identical marginal distributions. That X and Y have identical marginals is already implied by top-
to-bottom symmetry. Moreover, top-to-bottom symmetry, in conjunction with a+bi +bj +cij ≥ 0
for all i 6= j, implies a + bi ≥ 0 for all i. To verify this last claim, observe that
a + bi + bj + cij ≥ 0
a + bi + bk + cik ≥ 0
a + bi + bl + cil ≥ 0
together imply
3a + 2bi +
4 X
j=1
bj + cij + cik + cil ≥ 0. (25)
Since identical marginals and top-to-bottom symmetry imply a +
P4
j=1 bj + cij + cik + cil ≥ 0,
(25) thus reduces to a + bi ≥ 0. Therefore, under the hypotheses of the proposition, Y DISP X
is equivalent to a ≥ 0, 2a +
P4
i=1 bi ≥ 0, and, for all i 6= j, a + bi + bj + cij ≥ 0. Since, as
indicated above, these three inequalities are together equivalent to condition iv), we have shown
that conditions iii) and iv) are equivalent.
35We now decompose δ into 24 elementary transformations (ET’s) of the form deﬁned in (4): for
each of the 24 faces of the hypercube L = {0,1}4, there is one ET involving the 4 nodes on that
face. We will abuse notation slightly and let the value of δ at a given node also serve as the label
for that node. Let the two ET’s involving the nodes a, bi, bj, and cij (there are two such ET’s
because of the top-to-bottom symmetry of δ) have size βij = βji. Let the two ET’s involving the
nodes bi, cik, cil, bj (once again, there are two such ET’s because of the top-to- bottom symmetry)
have size αij = αji. There are 6 distinct values of βij and 6 distinct values of αij. For the 24 ET’s




bi + βij + βik + βil = αij + αik + αil ∀i 6= j 6= k 6= l
−cij + βij + βkl = αik + αil + αjk + αjl ∀i 6= j 6= k 6= l. (26)
These three (sets of) equations ensure that each of the (sets of) nodes labeled a, bi, and cij,
respectively, in Figure 2 is transformed from its values under the distribution f to its values under




bi + βij + βik + βil = αij + αik + αil ∀i 6= j 6= k 6= l
2αij + 2βkl = a + bi + bj + cij ∀i 6= j 6= k 6= l. (27)
Noting the similarity between the equations (27) and (17) for the 3-dimensional cube, set
βkl =












, ∀i 6= j. (28)
Recalling that top-to-bottom symmetry of δ implies that c12 = c34, c13 = c24, and c23 = c14, it is
easily checked that with these choices for βkl and αij, equations (27) are satisﬁed. Furthermore, if
a ≥ 0, 2a +
P4
i=1 bi ≥ 0 and for all i 6= j, a + bi + bj + cij ≥ 0, then βkl and αij as deﬁned in (28)
are all nonnegative. Thus, condition (iv) in the proposition implies the existence of a sequence of
nonnegative ET’s that sum to δ = g−f. Since each ET raises the expectation of any supermodular
function, g SPM f. By Theorem 2, it then follows that conditions i)-iv) are all equivalent.
36